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DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNER AND GSTACEY
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#) [CBW](#) [TRGY](#) [GM](#) [JA](#) [RS](#) [CA](#) [UK](#) [FR](#)
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: CANADA

REF: A. BERLIN 000845

11. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.

12. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal (coordinated by the NSC with strong U.S. interagency support) to expand and extend the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) for another 10 years (2022)/\$20 billion (U.S. \$10 billion; other GP donors \$10 billion) to address new and emerging global WMD threats. This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27 Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April 23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG) (reftel). All GP members recognize the evolving global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, but most have been resistant to our proposal) largely due to worries about cost and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada and the UK are the most supportive. Russia poses the strongest opposition and has expressed that the original Kananaskis priorities must be completed before moving forward. Germany has expressed similar concerns. Therefore the U.S. is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8 partners on this proposal, emphasizing that this commitment will help address critical global proliferation challenges, including the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative), and other G8 priorities. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND

13. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002 to address the spread of WMD, and now includes the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the EU. 2007 marks the halfway

point for the Global Partnership,s initial 10-year, \$20 billion commitment. GP donor pledges to date come in at over \$17 billion (including \$10 billion from the U.S.), plus an additional \$6 billion from Russia. The current GP scope addresses WMD threats only within Russia and other former Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and Ukraine are officially recognized as recipient states by the entire Partnership). The Kananaskis document anticipated an expansion by mandating that GP programs begin &initially in Russia8 but not be limited to Russia. In the context of the G8, the GP is handled by the GPWG, which reports to the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG). The GP is a unique model of multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats and has made great progress in its first five years to reduce the proliferation threat, including chemical weapons destruction; redirection of former WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; improving security for fissile nuclear materials, chemical weapons stocks and biological agents; and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines.

¶4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats includes four components: 1) Immediate expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union (to include the broadest possible participation of new recipient states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of broadest possible functional scope to include all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and missile threats; 3) Extension of time commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022); and 4) Increased financial commitment of an additional \$20 billion for 2012-2022 with the same parameters as original commitment (U.S. \$10 billion; \$10 billion from other donors). The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8 committed to coordinate activities to reduce the global WMD threat through the GP. Note that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was formed, already include a broad interpretation of threats (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important priorities of chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement.

¶5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the U.S. has gained strong support from Canada and the UK and more modest support from Japan and France for the first two objectives (geographic and programmatic expansion), with limited to no support for the 10-year extension and additional financial commitments at this time. Russia objects to the entire proposal.

CANADIAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

¶6. (SBU) Canada has been a strong supporter of the U.S. proposal with particularly avid interest in the need to geographically and programmatically expand the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats. However, Canada has stopped short of being able to

specifically endorse new financial commitments and the 10-year expansion at this time. The Canadian Political Director (Colleen Swords) sent a letter expressing strong support for the first two pieces of our proposal, with a preference to continue to work on the financial commitment and timeline for extension over the course of the next few years. Nonetheless, in the April 23 GPWG meeting, Canada was outspoken in its support for our proposals, focusing on the need to expand the Partnership worldwide and carefully not showing their inability to make the political commitment on new funds. Continued outreach on the proposal might help bring Canada around in their support for the entire proposal, and can only serve to strengthen their resolve to push hard with other G8 nations for geographic and programmatic expansion.

17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to reach out, at the highest appropriate level, to Canada to thank them for their outstanding support for geographic and programmatic expansion of the GP and press for support for the entire proposal as part of the Nonproliferation Leaders' statement. The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in the points below) will follow as an attachment by email to Post.

Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.

18. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE:

--We have greatly appreciated Canada's strong support for our proposal to expand the Global Partnership to combat new and emerging global WMD threats. Your support in the GPWG and through your Political Director and Sherpa has been critical.

--We now have Japan and France expressing interest in the geographic expansion, but Germany is still cool to the proposal. We seek your continued strong support at the highest possible levels to garner stronger support from Germany, to maintain the support we have from Japan and France, and to press the Italians to come around.

--We are also reaching out to Russia in hopes that they can come to the table with us as a partner in a geographic expansion and time extension of the GP) especially given Russia's solid support for joint initiatives to combat WMD worldwide, such as the Global Initiative and United Nations Security Resolution 1540.

--However, without new funding commitments to the GP to go along with the geographic expansion, Russia's support will be more difficult, and global programming will take more time.

--We recognize that the funding commitment is the most difficult part of the proposal, but we hope that you will be able to join us in supporting the full proposal, including the financial commitment and 10-year extension.

--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate activities to reduce the global WMD threat through the GP. It is time now to take the next step to continue and expand the GP.

--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional \$10 billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that Canada and other GP donors can also be able to match this.

--We greatly appreciate Canada's continued strong support for geographic and programmatic expansion,

and we hope that you will continue to consider the financial commitment and time extension.

--Can we count on you to strongly endorse this as an integral part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, statement?

--If possible, Canadian outreach to Germany and other G8 nations to support inclusion of this language in Nonproliferation Leaders statement and GP Midpoint Review document would be especially helpful.

END POINTS

19. (U) Department requests that reporting on this action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans), E (John Duncan and Benedict Wolf), P (Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and Jim Timbie), S/P (Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, Lisa Benthien), DoD/NNSA (Joyce Connery and Gerald Stacey) and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber).
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